

Turkey and an Army Forward

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We are at this moment fighting the first wars of the 21st century. [W]e learned on September 11, 2001, that our Nation is vulnerable to enemies who hide in the caves and shadows and strike in unexpected ways.

— Donald H. Rumsfeld¹

AS PART OF A joint force positioned in central Europe, forward-deployed U.S. Army forces are needed to provide a responsive, flexible deterrent. In “Toward a Future Army,” former U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege explains that a substantial joint and combined force must be able to respond to crises.² The strategic environment demands a forward-deployed, versatile, joint land force. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) meets that criteria with its forward staging bases, sophisticated training areas, comprehensive logistics infrastructure, efficient deployment operations, and versatile units.

The Strategic Environment

While a world dominated by two world powers allowed a measure of certainty and security, a multipolar environment causes uncertainty and complexity. In “Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia,”

Max G. Manwaring says, “Contemporary conflict is not only political but multinational, multiorganizational, multidimensional, and multicultural.”³

Threats to the United States and its allies have proliferated rather than diminished. Terrorist groups, transnational organizations, and regional powers pursue actions that threaten Western culture and interests. Religious, cultural, and ethnic differences continue to fester. In the past decade, as globalization has spread, international pressure and economic necessity have been the cause of numerous U.S. interventions around the world.

The 17 September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* outlines the challenges that were emerging from rogue states and terrorists at that time. Such threats will continue to seek ways to attack where the United States is weakest.⁴ An asymmetric construct is difficult to prepare for and even tougher to predict, so U.S. Armed Forces must be responsive, flexible, and versatile. President George W. Bush has clearly demonstrated that the United States will not withdraw behind its borders. As the strategic environment changes, USAREUR forces that are forward deployed in central Europe are adapting to meet the challenges.

The 1st ID in USAREUR

Since August 1952, USAREUR forces have been on point for the Nation. Recent operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly reveal the value of forward-deployed U.S. forces. Operations in Iraq, Israel, Turkey, the Balkans, and elsewhere, as well as ongoing force-protection missions in the central region, have been resounding successes.

The 1st Infantry Division (ID) is composed of seven brigades and four battalions forward-deployed in Germany as part of USAREUR. The 1st Brigade is stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. Because the 1st Brigade is committed to other war plans, it has not been available to support recent USAREUR contingencies, such as operations in Kosovo.

Established in June 1999, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force. KFOR is responsible for enforcing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, "On the Situation Relating to Kosovo," by establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo.⁵ In May 2002, the 1st ID's 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) began a 6-month tour of duty in Kosovo. Simultaneously, the 3d BCT prepared to replace the 2d BCT with transfer of authority (TOA) set for November 2002. (See figure 1.)

Although KFOR 4B was a smaller force because of ongoing restructuring, the 1st ID still had over 2,000 soldiers who would deploy in support of Operation Joint Guard. Although KFOR 4B comprised less than 20 percent of the division, it included key division staff personnel needed to round out the Multinational Brigade-East headquarters.

The TOA was a deliberate operation and the 1st ID's main effort. By November, one brigade was deployed, and the other was just beginning reintegration training that would include personnel and

equipment recovery, gunnery, and a combat maneuver training center rotation, all designed to reestablish the 2d BCT's combat readiness.

Meanwhile, V Corps, the 1st ID's higher headquarters, received orders to deploy in support of

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Operation Enduring Freedom. Because the 1st ID was split between the Balkans and the central region, it would not deploy with its parent headquarters. As the division set out to conduct split operations and to supervise the 2d BCT's retraining, it had no idea what loomed ahead.

The mission. Late in October 2002, the 1st ID received a verbal warning order from USAREUR that it would support Operation Enduring Freedom by deploying to Turkey. Initially, the 1st ID's mission was to become the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC mission eventually evolved into the 1st ID becoming a U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters.

Although initially murky, the mission ultimately became clear; it would set the conditions for the rapid reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the 4th ID in order to open a second front against the Iraqi regime. The 4th ID, known as Task Force (TF) Ironhorse, was a massive organization of 35,000 soldiers; 14,000 tracked and




Figure 1. First Infantry Division pre-operational task organization.

wheeled vehicles; and aircraft. The northern front afforded U.S. Central Command an operational double envelopment and was guaranteed to shorten the war.

After verbally receiving the ARFOR-T (Turkey) mission, the 1st ID staff conducted an estimate of the situation and an in-depth study of Turkey. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (also known as Kemal

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Ataturk) created Turkey from remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and became a member of NATO in 1952.⁶ Given Turkey's friendly relationship with the West, it was believed it would support U.S. desires to establish a line of communication (LOC) extending from the Iskenderun sea port of debarkation through Turkey into northern Iraq.

Despite friendly relations with the West, the threat level in Turkey was high because it was home to many groups hostile to the United States or against a war in Iraq. One group, the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party/Front, had links to a suicide bombing in Ankara on 20 May 2003.⁷ Other groups, such as the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the Turkish Hizbullah, and transnational groups like the Iraqi Intelligence Service, were also active in Turkey. Also, Al-Qaeda was thought to be monitoring Western activities in the region.

On 6 November 2002, the 1st ID published a warning order for this enormous mission, which normally would have been given to a corps-size headquarters.⁸ An ARFOR headquarters' role is drastically more diverse and expansive than a division is resourced for. Such a mission extends beyond the tactical level of war into the operational realm.

The staff's first task was to identify the ARFOR headquarters' mission. Using Field Manual (FM) 3-91, *Division Operations*, and Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, the 1st ID staff identified how the division headquarters would have to reorganize into an ARFOR headquarters.⁹ Already fractured because of the 2d Brigade's supporting mission in Kosovo, the 1st ID

found this to be no easy task; however, once the staff determined the headquarters' organization, they began filling critical shortages internally from subordinate commands. The next step was to build the team and begin training.

Preparation. From 12 to 15 November 2002, the 1st ID exercised its new headquarters organization and configuration in a command post exercise (CPX) as part of the "crawl" stage of the mission. The learning curve was high as the staff wrestled with operational tasks such as movement and maneuver; combat service support and logistics; and force protection. The staff then aggressively addressed each lesson learned. During the first week of December, the ARFOR-T team hosted an ARFOR/joint seminar led by Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Team D, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which focused on the operational level of war.

With the team built and leaders educated, ARFOR-T conducted a second CPX immediately following the seminar. The CPX served as the "walk" stage of the mission and addressed lessons from the first exercise and applied lessons learned from BCTP Team D. Again, the learning curve was steep, but the staff set out to fix the shortfalls.

Simultaneous with the training, the staff continued its enormous planning effort while struggling with the uncertainty of the mission. In mid-December, to facilitate coordination and a synchronized plan, the 1st ID sent key leaders to Fort Hood, Texas, to participate in the 4th ID's deployment and warfighter exercises. By late December, the ARFOR-T task organization was complete. (See figure 2.)

Ambiguity, stemming directly from the inability to confirm or deny numerous assumptions made during ARFOR-T planning, continued. The assumptions included host-nation (HN) security, LOC conditions, medical support, use of U.S. military rotary-wing aircraft, and HN intentions across the border into northern Iraq. Although its units were geographically dispersed throughout Germany, ARFOR-T managed to gather the team for key military decisionmaking planning events and published its operation plan (OPLAN) by 16 December 2002.

Throughout the Christmas holiday, 18 key ARFOR-T staff members were on 24-hour recall to be deployed to Turkey as part of a site-coordination team (reconnaissance). Alerted and then stood down several times, the team endured a roller-coaster ride because of Turkey's bureaucracy, an indicator of things to come.

During the first week of January, ARFOR-T con-




Figure 2. ARFOR-T task organization.

ACE – airspace control element
 ARFOR – Army forces
 ASB – aviation support battalion
 CA – civil affairs
 CSC – combat support company
 FET – foreign emergency support team
 FET – field effect transistor
 HR – human relations

HSC – headquarters and support company
 LTF – logistics task force
 MC – medical corps
 MMC – materiel management center
 MDM – mobile depot maintenance
 MP – military police
 MSB – main support battalion

NMCB – naval mobile construction battalion
 P – personnel
 ROC – rear operation commander
 SES – staff engineer section
 SG – signal group
 SOCCE – special operations command and control element

ducted a liaison officer's (LNO's) academy taught by local subject matter experts to ensure that the LNOs were properly trained before going to locations such as Coalition Forces Land Component Command, European Command (EUCOM), USAREUR, and Turkey. On 12 January, the site survey team finally received approval to deploy for what was only supposed to be 2 weeks. For some team members, such as the 1st ID G3 and the Division Support Command commander, 2 weeks stretched to 3 months. Because the team consisted primarily of ARFOR-T key leaders and staff, this further burdened an already overtaxed headquarters.

On 16 January 2003, the ARFOR-T staff briefed the OPLAN to its major subordinate commands (MSCs), including all units external to the 1st ID. ARFOR-T then conducted "command pit" training, which resulted in command post (CP) procedures and reporting to train ARFOR-T personnel on operational battle-tracking. The USAREUR campaign plan was published on 30 January 2003. Fortunately, ARFOR and USAREUR planning staffs were in constant contact, conducting parallel planning

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throughout the entire process, which resulted in only minor changes to the ARFOR plan. Unfortunately, the EUCOM OPLAN was not published until 10 February, by which time ARFOR-T was already in execution.

While its equipment from all over Germany and the United States was being railed and loaded on ships destined for Turkey, ARFOR-T conducted a rehearsal of concept (ROC) for all key players. Although challenging to execute given its scope, the ROC was successful; however, because its CP equipment was not available, ARFOR-T could not conduct a third CPX as initially intended. However,

leaders conducted an ARFOR-T leader's seminar to address key topics such as Turkish culture and rules of engagement. ARFOR-T also conducted pre-deployment processing to ensure deploying personnel had critical items such as wills, powers of attorney, and required immunizations.

The ARFOR-T site coordination team took the lead from EUCOM and evolved into a country team

Personnel deployment began in an expeditionary fashion to establish initial-entry capability with 2,200 ARFOR-T site-preparation soldiers. According to the plan, site-preparation soldiers would only be on the ground for up to 7 days before the main body deployed. The main body never arrived. . . . The site-preparation soldiers had to provide their own security. Even battalion commanders and primary staff pulled guard duty.

that coordinated directly with the Turks. The team developed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the governments of Turkey and the United States. In addition, the team began the leasing process to acquire facilities and space to support seaport, airport, and convoy operations across a 500-mile highway in southeast Turkey to the border with Iraq. Officers and noncommissioned officers, who were comfortable with tactical-level operations but had never been trained on MOU negotiations or real estate acquisition, oversaw this coordination. Although Turkey was a NATO ally, its mire of bureaucracy hindered the site coordination team and slowed operations.

Road to Execution

In mid-February, political rhetoric and strategic pressure increased the likelihood of an intervention in Iraq. UNSCR 1441, "On the Return of Weapons Inspectors to Iraq," directed Iraq to provide an accurate accounting of any weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰ The U.S. and Great Britain deemed Iraq's account unacceptable. War seemed inevitable, and pressure for deployment into Turkey was at the boiling point.

Although the plan called for deployment based on the necessary conditions being set in Turkey, such as a signal architecture and command and control (C2) nodes, strategic pressure won out. Personnel deployment began in an expeditionary fashion to establish initial-entry capability with 2,200 ARFOR-T site-preparation soldiers. According to the plan, site-

preparation soldiers would only be on the ground for up to 7 days before the main body deployed. The main body never arrived.

Living conditions, austere at best, included leased warehouses not designed as living quarters or office space. As with any expeditionary operation, conditions improved through the staggering efforts of U.S. soldiers and civilians. Concurrent to opening the LOC, the small contingent of ARFOR-T soldiers continued to improve living conditions and provide force protection. Because the main body never arrived, the site-preparation soldiers had to provide their own security. Even battalion commanders and primary staff pulled guard duty.

Conceptually, movement across southeastern Turkey was from west to east along an LOC that included 5 different ports of debarkation, 3 convoy support centers, 4 rest stops, 32 checkpoints, and 6 traffic control points along highway E90 to enhance convoy visibility and safety. The entire trip is just less than 700 kilometers (km) and took heavy-equipment transports (HET) over 30 hours of driving time to complete (based on an average of 24-km per hour).

Daily, the ARFOR-T headquarters struggled with the Turkish military for approval of seemingly basic requests such as unrestricted movement of C2, MEDEVAC, maintenance, safety, security, personnel, equipment, and supplies along highway E90. Headquarters had to make significant efforts to gain Turkish understanding and approval of the U.S. plan to pass a mechanized ground force through Turkey. For example, the ARFOR-T commanding general met with the Turkish general staff and Turkish corps commanders to brief them on the concept of operation. Although Turkish military leaders gained an appreciation for and even apparently supported the ARFOR-T plan, their political arm stymied them.

Despite sluggish political activity, ARFOR-T aggressively continued to set conditions for the 4th ID. The force constructed a division tactical assembly area (TAA) north of the Iraqi border near Silopi, Dicle, and Cizre. The TAA was to include an ammunition upload point to support up to 2,000 containers of ammunition and a "fuel bag farm" for two million gallons of diesel.

ARFOR-T personnel negotiated contracts to improve the rail line in southeast Turkey, and as with all ARFOR-T operations, a rehearsal was conducted with ARFOR-T equipment to proof the rail and to ensure it was adequate for the 4th ID. Six ships of ARFOR-T equipment were downloaded at the port of Iskenderun, and 1,200 vehicles, trailers, and containers were moved.



1st ID soldiers in Kirkuk, September 2003.

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The division conducted rehearsals for every facet of the operation, including a HET movement with the 701st MSB. ARFOR-T prepared to receive the 4th ID by stockpiling enormous amounts of fuel, water, and food. The ARFOR-T plan called for substantial maintenance and recovery capabilities along the entire distance of the approach march to ensure the rapid movement of TF Ironhorse. Finally, subordinate ARFOR-T elements negotiated commercial contracts to support the movement of military equipment.

From the beginning, ARFOR-T set and maintained rigorous force-protection standards that required continuous coordination with the Turkish Jandarma, a paramilitary organization under the control of the minister of interior that was responsible for security in rural areas. In addition, the ARFOR-T forward surgical team, which came from USAREUR, and E/701st MSB, the 1st ID's medical company, set up operations at every ARFOR-T node. They were to support the 4th ID's approach march and the expected combat in northern Iraq. All preparations were accomplished in the face of significant HN bureaucracy that, coming from a NATO ally, perplexed and frustrated

ARFOR-T soldiers and leaders.

During this frenzied activity, the balance of the 14,000 ARFOR-T and 35,000 4th ID troops were in Germany, and the United States awaited approval from Turkey to allow ground troops into the country. ARFOR-T soon discovered that the Turkish government was politically indecisive, as the November 2002 elections and subsequent votes by the Turkish Parliament proved. Turkey was reluctant to support a U.S. attack because Turkey was still in the midst of an economic crisis dating from 2001. Turkey still had unofficial trade ties with Iraq, and it still had its own aspirations for northern Iraq. Also, over 90 percent of Turkey's population openly opposed the war.

On 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament initially voted to approve movement of the 4th ID through the country, but within hours the decision was overturned. Weeks passed and the Parliament finally agreed to allow overflight rights only. Eventually, Turkish leaders signaled that approval for a ground force would never come.

Approximately 3 weeks later, the 4th ID received orders to deploy through Kuwait. Still, ARFOR-T persevered and continued to portray a U.S. presence



Major General John Batiste (right) with Major General Walter Pudlowski of the 28th Infantry Division, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, July 2003.

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in southeastern Turkey. ARFOR-T's positioning afforded the EUCOM commander flexibility to deal with uncertainty.

Right up until redeployment from Turkey, ARFOR-T planned several potential contingencies. For example, within a 24-hour period, the ARFOR-T staff planned the RSOI of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit; ground support of the 173d Brigade deployed to the Bashur airfield in northern Iraq; and consolidation of internal ARFOR-T assets to conduct a demonstration in northern Iraq.

The ARFOR-T mission alone would be taxing to any division headquarters. However, the 1st ID was not simply responsible for ARFOR-T, it also had its 3d BCT and part of its staff in Kosovo enforcing UNSCR 1244. Further demonstrating the deployability and versatility of USAREUR forces, the 1st ID was also the force provider for the EUCOM/Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR), Immediate Ready Task Force (IRTF) that deployed into northern Iraq as part of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

Task Force 1-63 deployed by air in March as part of the largest airborne armored operation in history and provided much needed mechanized forces in northern Iraq. After TF 1-63 deployed, the 1st ID provided the backup IRTF. On deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq, the 1st ID also provided the southern region force—a battalion-size task force. Finally, the 1st ID commander, through the rear detachment commander, conducted rear detachment operations, which included the critical mission of force protection across two area support groups (ASGs) (the 98th ASG and the 100th ASG), including six military kasernes.

Keys to Success

Despite Turkey's denial of access, ARFOR-T was still responsible for a strategic deception that fixed up to 13 Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq, reducing enemy strength for the V Corps fight in and around Baghdad. In addition, the 1st ID deployed TF 1-63 into northern Iraq and prepared the backup Central Region Immediate Reaction Force and the Southern Region Immediate Reaction Force. All of this was executed without loss of life or serious injury. Several common threads were key to the successful execution of these missions.

Battle command. According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 6-0, *Command and Control*, battle command has three components: visualize, describe, and direct.¹¹ While planning ARFOR-T operations in Turkey, the commanding general developed the commander's intent early. The intent included elements of operational design, such as the center of gravity, the end state, and nonlinear operations. In addition, the commanding general specified key tasks required to accomplish the mission. In the OPLAN, he clearly designated decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. He directed the organization through orders, battle update briefs, and by his presence or personal involvement with subordinate commanders.

Since the days of Napoleon, commanders have used what is called the "directed telescope" approach to monitor and ensure operations are executed in accordance with the commander's intent.¹² Both General Burwell B. Bell, USAREUR commander, and Major General John Batiste, ARFOR-T commander, used the directed telescope approach to drive operations. They focused on events they deemed critical and emphasized MEDEVAC operations and force protection. Finally, the 1st ID was able to accomplish its myriad mis-



A soldier from Task Force 1-63 provides security during a raid in Kirkuk, 12 June 2003.

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sions because the ARFOR-T commander and his staff—

- Empowered and resourced competent, capable leaders.
- Established and enforced clear C2.
- Ensured that systems were in place to track the commander's critical information requirements.
- Ensured that information-sharing among the staff and subordinate commands was seamless.

Anticipatory planning. Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Preparation*, describes anticipatory planning involving aggressive parallel planning as being absolutely essential in seizing the initiative.¹³ To stay ahead in the uncertain environment of operational planning in support of U.S. Central Command's operations, planners at EUCOM, USAREUR, and ARFOR-T communicated several times a day. Success also required the ARFOR-T commanding general and chief of staff to anticipate events, provide guidance to their staffs, and act decisively when required.

Centralized planning and decentralized execution. Despite the fluid environment that surrounded the planning of ARFOR-T operations and the frustration resulting from Turkish bureaucracy, ARFOR-T operations were focused. Planning was centralized with the command group involved in the entire planning process, including the ARFOR-T wargame that extended over 3 days.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, describes span of control as the number of subordinate units under a single commander.¹⁴ Although span of control is situation-dependent, commanders can effectively command two to five subordinate units. As the ARFOR-T commander, the 1st ID commanding general commanded 13 units in Turkey, not counting the responsibilities in TF 1-63, the IRTF, the secure reserve force, and the central region force. Because the ARFOR-T commander decentralized operations and empowered his subordinates, he was able to command and control this broad organization.

Information-sharing. To facilitate common understanding and situational awareness, ARFOR-T planners distributed daily planning notes highlighting plans status; the day's significant events; the commander's decisions; the staff's suspenses and

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requirements; and a time line. The planner's notes were sent out on a recurring basis to further information-sharing across MSCs. The staff also hosted weekly working groups such as force protection and planning. Attendees for the working groups included planning representatives from all the staff sections and MSCs. Simultaneously, the staff tracked current operations from the division main command pit each day. Finally, through all stages of the deployment, ARFOR-T maintained a website for information-sharing. Each staff section was authorized an information-management officer with permission to post to the website and to grant permission to other users. All sections were then able to post their information.

Poised and Ready

Trying to look into the future is always problematic. However, as the U.S. Army Vision outlines, "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need

for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum. We will provide to the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively."¹⁵

Given the future environment, an agile, adaptive forward-deployed Army presence is imperative. Wass de Czege says, "Time is always a critical commodity at all levels of war, and the enemy is more likely to quit sooner than later if he is also faced with a strong, credible ground close combat threat."¹⁶ U.S. Army forces in Europe provide an overwhelming deterrent to any potential threat to the United States and its allies by providing tremendous capability and flexibility.

As globalization and economics draw the world closer together, the expectation for U.S. intervention to confront threats will increase. To meet and defeat the wide range of threats to Western security, U.S. military presence, forward deployed in Europe, will answer the call, as USAREUR and the 1st ID did in Germany, Kosovo, Turkey, and northern Iraq.

In 2002, Bush stated that the "struggle against global terrorism is different than any war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time."¹⁷ The 1st ID, as part of the USAREUR forward-deployed joint team continues to be poised and ready to meet that challenge. **MR**

NOTES

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "but military must be able to fight in 21st century," *The Washington Post*, 26 May 2003.

2. Huba Wass de Czege, "Toward a Future Army," 28 September 2002. [Source not given.]

3. Max G. Marwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters* (Winter 1998): 2.

4. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 17 September 2002). See also on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, accessed on 20 May 2003. The threat is even more volatile when combined with longstanding ethnic and religious divisions. For a detailed essay on this subject, see Michael T. Klare, "Waging Postindustrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield," *Current History* (December 2001): 436.

5. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, "On the Situation Relating to Kosovo," on-line at <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/sc99.html>. For more information about the Kosovo Force, see on-line at <www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm>, accessed on 20 May 2003.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Atatürk), commander of the Ottoman Empire's 19th Division, defeated the British at Gallipoli in 1915. For more information, see on-line at <www.firstworldwar.com/bio/kemal.htm>. See also "Turkey," *The World Factbook*, on-line at <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html#intr>.

7. Suzan Fraser, "Turkish Café Bombing Kills One," *The Associated Press*, 21

May 2003.

8. The 10th Mountain Division was the ARFOR headquarters in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. However, the scope of ARFOR-T exceeded previous historical examples in geographical scope and sheer troop strength.

9. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-91, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 October 2002); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 26 February 1993).

10. UNSCR 1441, "On the Return of Weapons Inspectors to Iraq," on-line at <www.1ai-bab.com/arab/docs/iraq/uns1441.htm>. See also <www.un.org/search/>, accessed on 18 May 2003.

11. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1993); FM 6-0 *Command and Control* (Washington, DC: GPO, DRAG version, February 2002).

12. For a detailed description of "directed telescope," see Martin Van Crevelde, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 272.

13. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Preparation* (Washington, DC: GPO, 31 May 1997).

14. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

15. U.S. Army Vision, see on-line at <www.army.mil/vision/index.html>, accessed on 20 May 2003.

16. Wass de Czege.

17. *National Security Strategy*.